In this paper we present a model of oligopoly and …nancial constraints. We study allocations which are bankruptcy-free (BF) in the sense that no …rm can drive another …rm to bankruptcy without becoming bankrupt. We show how such allocations can be sustained as an equilibrium of a dynamic game. When there are two …rms, all equilibria yield BF allocations. When there are more than two …rms, allocations other than BF can be sustained as equilibria but in some cases the set of BF allocations still useful in explaining the shape of equilibrium set.
Introduction
There is ample evidence that …nancial constraints play an important role in the behavior of …rms (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989 ; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) . We begin with the observation that the punishment for violation of a …nancial constraint must be severe or otherwise …rms would default all the time. Suppose that the punishment is so severe that …rms violating …nancial constraints loose the ability to compete and, in fact, disappear (Sharfstein and Bolton, 1990) . Firms might then have incentives to take actions that will make it impossible for competitors to ful…ll …nancial constraints in the hope to get rid of them.
In this paper we provide a model of oligopolistic interaction among …rms when they fully take into account the …nancial constraints of all other …rms and not only their own …nancial constraints. We model these …nancial constraints by assuming that pro…ts must be greater than or equal to an exogenously given value. When pro…ts are below this value, we will say that this …rm is bankrupted. Our aim is to o¤er a dynamic theory of oligopoly in which …rms can bankrupt each other. This theory is in sharp contrast to the standard theory of repeated games in which bankruptcy considerations are not considered.
Our …rst step is to de…ne the set of actions that are bankruptcy-free (BF in the following). This set of actions has two properties. On the one hand, pro…ts are not less than some exogenously given value for any …rm. On the other hand, no …rm can be pushed below this value by any action of another …rm that obtains pro…ts in excess of this value. The concept of BF captures the opportunities for ruining other players that are not captured by standard concepts such as Cournot equilibrium. We show that such a concept plays an important role in shaping the set of long-run equilibria in an industry.
Our second step consists of characterizing the set of BF actions under alternative assumptions.
For simplicity, we con…ne ourselves to the case in which the product is homogeneous. 1 In the case in which average costs are non-decreasing, we show that a large number of output vectors are BF (Proposition 1). For instance, when all …rms have constant average costs and all …rms are identical, any output vector yielding non-negative pro…ts is BF (Example 1). When there are two …rms with identical increasing average costs, the set of BF output vectors is a square (Example 2).
By contrast, when average costs are decreasing, BF output vectors are either such that all …rms 1 We note that some forms of product heterogeneity are equivalent to product homogeneity.
have zero pro…ts and further increases in output produce negative pro…ts or those in which only one …rm is active (Proposition 2 and Example 3). Thus, BF captures the idea, present in many informal discussions, that markets with non-decreasing costs and markets with decreasing costs are fundamentally di¤erent. In our case this is because under increasing costs, ruining a competitor requires an increase in the average cost that makes the attacking …rm weaker. Under decreasing costs, ruining a competitor implies a decrease in average costs that make the attacking …rm even stronger.
Our next step is to consider a dynamic game in which …rms can be bankrupted and accordingly they might disappear. This setup is not a repeated game because the game in each period depends on the strategies chosen in the past. Rather it is a special case of a stochastic game (Shapley, 1953; Neyman and Sorin, 2003) in which transition probabilities are zero or one (Masso and Neme, 1996) .
Such games are called Dynamic Games. To simplify our task we make two assumptions: pro…ts cannot be transferred from one period to the next and the …nancial constraint in each period requires that pro…ts must be non-negative in each period. The second assumption is innocuous because it entails just a numerarization of pro…ts. However, the …rst assumption is certainly not innocuous and is discussed later on.
We …rst note that if the Nash equilibrium (NE) corresponding to the static game is BF, this allocation can be supported as a Subgame Perfect NE (SPNE). Next, we show for duopoly that when the discount rate is su¢ ciently close to one, any NE must yield BF allocations (Proposition 3). Unfortunately, this result cannot extended to three players (Example 4). Given this result, we study equilibria by considering separately the cases in which average costs are increasing and decreasing. 2 Consider …rst increasing average costs. The concept of minimax payo¤ plays an important role here (as in the folk theorem for repeated games) but it has to be adapted to the case in which actions are constrained to be BF. We refer to this adaptation as the minimax BF payo¤. We show that any BF action pro…le that gives a payo¤ greater than the minimax BF payo¤ can be supported as an SPNE for a discount factor close to one (Proposition 5). Furthermore, payo¤s less than the minimax BF payo¤ cannot be sustained in any SPNE (Proposition 4).
Finally, we tackle the case of decreasing average costs. We show that BF action pro…les with at 2 The case of constant returns is a limit case between increasing a decreasing average costs and is brie ‡y considered. least two active …rms cannot be supported by an NE and we give conditions under which BF action pro…les with only one active …rm can be supported as NE (Proposition 7). We also show that action pro…les in which all …rms produce a positive quantity cannot be supported as NE (Proposition 8).
However, there are SPNE with all but one active …rms (Example 8).
Our results show that introduction of a …nancial constraint a¤ects the equilibrium strategies of …rms and, in some cases, substantially reduces the set of equilibrium payo¤s. For example, Proposition 3 implies that the folk theorem of repeated games does not hold in our setup. Moreover, playing the Cournot equilibrium in each period and the standard stick-and-carrot punishments need not be an NE either. This shows that our approach has important implications for collusion, merger and thus, anti-trust policy.
We end this introduction with a preliminary discussion of the literature (see more on this in the …nal section). Although a number of papers demonstrate that the …nancial structure does a¤ect market outcomes in oligopoly, most previous studies adopt either static or two-stage models. Kawakami and Yoshida (1997) and Spagnolo (2000) are the only two exceptions. Both papers make use of repeated games like ours. The former incorporates a simple exit constraint into the repeated prisoners'dilemma. In their model, each …rm must exit from the market no matter how it plays if the rival deviates over a certain period of time. Fixing the length of such an endurable period of time intrinsic to each …rm, they show that predation can occur when a discount factor becomes large. The latter study examines the role of stock options in repeated Cournot games. In this model, unlike standard repeated games, …rms do not necessarily maximize average discounted pro…ts because stock options a¤ect managers'incentives. Considering this e¤ect, Spagnolo shows that collusion is easily achieved. Finally, our approach might provide support to the notion that …rms may engage in predatory activities when pursuing pro…t maximization. Standard explanations of this behavior are based on incomplete information (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) , the learning curve (Cabral and Riordan, 1994) or …rms playing an attrition game (Roth, 1996) . In our model, …rms have complete information, the technology is …xed and …rms play standard quantity-setting games. However, our concept of BF focuses on allocations in which predation is impossible. Predation in equilibrium might occur when there are sunk costs. 3 3 An example is available under request.
Bankruptcy-Free Allocations
There are n …rms. Each …rm, say i, has an action space denoted by S i . An action could be an output, a price, a supply function, etc. An action pro…le is a vector of actions s 2 n i=1 S i . Let s i = (s 1 ; ::; s i 1 ; s i+1 ; ::; s n ); and (ŝ i ; s i ) = (s 1 ; ::; s i 1 ;ŝ i ; s i+1 ; ::; s n ): The pro…t of …rm i depends on the action pro…le and is denoted by i (s). De…nition 1. An action pro…leŝ = (ŝ 1 ;ŝ 2 ; ::::;ŝ n ) is bankruptcy-free (BF) if: a) i (ŝ) 0; for all i 2 f1; ::; ng. b) For all s j such that j (ŝ j ; s j ) 0; i (ŝ j ; s j ) 0 for all i 6 = j:
In other words, a pro…le of actions is BF if it yields non negative pro…ts for all …rms and no …rm can change its action, obtain non-negative pro…ts and ruin other …rm. Note that if …rms are required to make v i pro…ts to avoid bankruptcy, we can de…ne a new pro…t function as 0
and rede…ne BF with respect to this new pro…t function.
To grasp the implications of BF on economic environments, in this section we study the set of BF actions in the quantity-setting model, one of the most popular models in industrial organization.
Let s i = x i where x i 2 R + denotes the quantity set by …rm i. Let x = (x 1 ; ::; x n ) be a quantity pro…le and p i (x) be the inverse demand function for …rm i assumed to be strictly decreasing in x i .
Let c i (x i ) be the cost of producing x i for …rm i: The average cost of producing x i is denoted by
. Unless stated speci…cally we will assume that c i (0) = 0. We assume that pro…ts for any …rm are a concave function of its own output when this output is positive. Spence (1980) observed that some models of product heterogeneity can be transformed into the model of a single homogeneous product. Given this observation we will concentrate on the case of product homogeneity. If a …rm is producing a positive quantity we call it an active …rm. Otherwise it is an inactive …rm. Clearly, an action pro…le with all inactive …rms and no sunk costs is BF: In what follows we concentrate in the characterization of BF action pro…les with at least an active …rm.
We start by characterizing the set of BF action pro…les for n …rms with non-decreasing average costs. We assume that for all i; and for all x i ; there exist x i 6 = 0 such that i (x i ; x i ) = 0: To build intuition, we …rst consider two examples. It is easy to see that this example can be generalized to more than two …rms and any continuous inverse demand. In this case, only the …rm with the lowest average cost can be active in a BF allocation. Let us consider now the case in which average costs are increasing.
Example 2. Suppose there are two …rms with identical increasing average costs c i (x i ) = 0:5x 2 i ; i = 1; 2. The inverse demand function is p(x 1 ; x 2 ) = (10 x 1 x 2 ). Thus, i (x 1 ; x 2 ) = (10 Figure 2 , the area where x 2 10 1:5x 1 plus the vertical axis (resp. x 1 10 1:5x 2 plus the horizontal axis) is the locus of points in which …rm 1 (resp. 2) has non-negative pro…ts. Both lines intersect at (4; 4). Starting from any action pro…le in the
, we see that a unilateral change in output by, say, …rm 1 cannot drive …rm 2 to bankruptcy without …rm 1 being bankrupt itself. However a point such as (1; 5) is not BF because …rm 1 can produce output of 3 and drive …rm 2 to bankruptcy without being bankrupt itself. Again the above example can be generalized to two …rms with continuous increasing average costs and facing a continuous and decreasing inverse demand function whenever (x 1 ;x 2 ) such that i (x 1 ;x 2 ) = 0; andx i 6 = 0; i = 1; 2; exist. In these cases, an action pro…le (x 1 ; x 2 ) is BF if and only if x i x i for all i 2 f1; 2g and i (x 1 ; x 2 ) 0.
We are now prepared for our …rst characterization that covers all the above cases. is BF if i (x) 0 for all i 2 N; and any of the following conditions hold.
(i) All …rms have the same average cost, that is, AV C j (x j ) = AV C k (x k ) for all j; k; or (ii) For all active …rms j; k if AV C j (x j ) < AV C k (x k ); …rm j can always increases its output in a way that matches the average cost of …rm k, retaining non negative pro…ts. That is, there isx j
Proof. It is obvious that the action pro…les described in (i) are BF: For the action pro…les described in (ii); since the average cost is non-decreasing it is obvious that no …rm with positive production can drive a …rm with lower average cost to bankruptcy. It is also obvious that no inactive …rm can enter the market and drive the active …rms to bankruptcy. We also show that it is not possible for a …rm with positive production to drive a …rm with higher average cost to bankruptcy. Let x j be such that
; since the average cost is non-decreasing, then p(
; and since average cost is non-decreasing, x j <x j : Then p(
Therefore, for all k 6 = j; with higher average cost p(
Finally, we show that any other action pro…le cannot be BF:
1 ; :::; x 0 n ) be such that i (x 0 ) 0 for all i 2 N; and suppose that there are two active …rms, j and k; with AV C j (x 0 j ) < AV C k (x 0 k ); and such that, forx j with AV C j (
Since j (x 0 ) > 0 and the price-average cost difference is decreasing, …rm j can decrease production and make cero pro…ts. That is, there is
; which implies that …rm j can drive …rm k to bankruptcy. Let x 0 = (x 0 1 ; :::; x 0 n ) be such that i (x 0 ) 0 for all i 2 N; and suppose that there are two active …rms, j and k; with AV C j (x 0 j ) < AV C k (x 0 k ); and such that …rm j can never match the average cost of …rm k; that is, for allx j ; AV C j (x j ) < AV C k (x 0 k ): Let x j be such that p(
; …rm k can increase his production above x k and make …rm j bankrupt while retaining positive pro…ts.
We now consider the case of decreasing average costs. As before, to build intuition we …rst consider an example. and c i (0) = 0: Let p(x 1 + x 2 ) = 100 x 1 x 2 : The area in which both …rms have positive pro…ts is x 2 90 x 1 88=x 1 (continuous line in Figure 3 ) and x 1 90 x 2 88=x 2 (dotted line in Figure   3 ). Point B = (B 1 ; B 2 ) = (44; 44) is a BF action pro…le such that i (x 1 ;x 2 ) = 0: Note that when x 1 = x 2 = 1, both agents also have zero pro…ts, but this action pro…le is not BF because, say, …rm 1 can produce output of 88, obtaining zero pro…ts and bankrupting …rm 2. Also note that all action pro…les such that x 2 = 0; x 1 B 1 and 1 (x 1 ; 0) 0, or x 1 = 0; x 2 B 2 and 2 (0; x 2 ) 0 are BF: It is easy to see in Figure 3 that no other action pro…le can be BF: Our next result characterizes the set of BF allocations under decreasing average costs. We restrict our attention to economies that satisfy the following assumption. Assumption 1. The inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and lim x!1 p(x) = 0: Each …rm has decreasing average cost with lim x!1 AV C i (x) = a i > 0; and there is (x 1 ; ::; x n ) such that
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence and uniqueness of an action pro…le (x 1 ; ::;x n ) >> (0; ::; 0) such that j (x 1 ; ::;x n ) = 0; and @ j (x 1 ; ::;x n )=@x j < 0 for all j 2 f1; ::; ng:
We will use this action pro…le (x 1 ; ::;x n ) in the following proposition. (ii) There are at least two active …rms. For all active …rms; i (x 1 ; ::; x n ) = 0 and @ i (x 1 ; ::; x n )=@x i < 0; for all inactive …rms, i ( x i ; x i ) < 0 for all x i > 0:
Proof. Step 1. We show …rst that no action pro…le (x 1 ; :::; x n ) such that at least two …rms are active and at least one has strictly positive pro…ts is BF:
Without lost of generality, suppose that …rm 1 and 2 are active, and 1 (x 1 ; ::; x n ) > 0. If
AV C 2 (x 2 ): Let y > x 1 be such that 1 (y; x 2 ; ::; x n ) = 0; by Assumption 1, y exist. If …rm 1 increases its production from x 1 to y; the price will be equal to the average cost of y; and since the average cost is decreasing,
…rm 2 is bankrupt.
Step 1 tells us that only action pro…les such that all …rms have zero pro…ts or action pro…les for which only one …rm has positive pro…ts and all others are not active can be BF:
Step 2. We show that an action pro…le (x 1 ; :::; x n ); such that for all i 2 f1; :::; ng; i (x 1 ; ::; x n ) = 0;
with at least two active …rms and such that @ i (x 1 + :: + x n )=@x i 0 for some of the active …rms, is not BF:
Suppose that the …rm with the above characteristics is …rm 1: Since @ i (x 1 + :: + x n )=@x i 0; …rm 1 can slightly increase its output and obtain non negative pro…ts. Since the price will decrease, all other active …rms will be bankrupt.
Step 3. We show that an action pro…le (x 1 ; :::; x n ); such that for all i 2 f1; :::; ng; i (x 1 ; ::; x n ) = 0;
with at least two active …rms such that for all active …rms @ i (x 1 + :: + x n )=@x i < 0; and such that for at least one inactive …rm j there exist x j > 0 such that j ( x j ; x j ) 0; cannot be BF:
If this were the case, the inactive …rm j could produce x j and retain non negative pro…ts. Since the price will decrease, all active …rms will be bankrupted.
Step 4. We show that the action pro…les with at least two active …rms such that for all i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng, i (x 1 ; ::; x n ) = 0; for all active …rms @ i (x 1 ; ::; x n )=@x i < 0, and for all inactive …rms
Clearly, inactive …rms cannot increase production without bankrupting themselves. Active …rms can only bankrupt other active …rms by increasing their production, but since @ i (x 1 ; ::; x n )=@x i < 0 and pro…ts are concave; this will also bankrupt them.
Step 5. We show that an action pro…le with only one active …rm and such that x i <x i is not BF:
Suppose that an inactive …rm j produces x j 6 = 0 such that x j + x i =x 1 + ::: +x n : Since x i <x i ,
Since average cost is decreasing AV C j (x j ) < AV C j (x j ); and thus j (0; ::; x i ; 0; ::; x j ) > 0:
which implies that …rm i is bankrupt.
Step 6. Finally, we show that action pro…les with only one active …rm and such that x i x i are
BF:
We show that no inactive …rm j can bankrupt the active …rm i:For this it is enough to show that for all x j such that j (0; ::; x i ; ::; x j ; ::; 0) 0; then i (0; ::; x i ; ::; x j ; ::; 0) 0:
Suppose …rst that j is such that
which implies that i (0; ::; x i ; ::; x j ; ::; 0) 0:
If x j >x j ; suppose that i (0; ::; x i ; ::; x j ; :
Since pro…ts are concave for strictly positive values of x j ; and j (x 1 ; ::;x n ) = 0 with @ j (x 1 ; ::;x n )=@x j 0; then j (0; ::; x i ; ::; x j ; ::; 0) < 0;
which contradicts the hypothesis. Thus, i (0; ::; x i ; ::; x j ; ::; 0) 0:
Suppose that j is such that x i P k6 =jx k . First, we show that x j x j : If x j >x j ; given that x i P k6 =jx k ; then x i + x j > P n k=1x k ; but by the de…nition of (x 1 ; ::;x n ) and given that pro…ts are concave for strictly positive values of x j , j (x j ; x j ) will be negative. Thus
The above steps prove that the BF action pro…les are those described in (i) and (ii)
Notice that the point (B 1 ; B 2 ) in Example 3 corresponds to the outputs described in part (ii)
in Proposition 2. The outputs in part (i) correspond to those in Example 3 in which one of the …rms is inactive and the other …rm produces, at least, the corresponding B i .
Proposition 2 can be easily adapted to the case in which …rms have sunk costs, i.e. c(0) = k. In this case in any BF action pro…le all …rms must be active, otherwise they are bankrupt. Therefore the set of BF action pro…les reduces to those in part (ii) in Proposition 2 (point B in Figure 3 ).
Long-Run Competition with Bankruptcy
In this section we consider a dynamic game with an in…nite horizon in which …rms can be bankrupt.
We identify conditions under which such dynamic competition leads to BF allocations as de…ned in the previous section.
Each …rm, say i, has an action space denoted by S i that can be interpreted as the output, price, etc. set by this …rm. In each period, say t, each …rm chooses an action s t i : The payo¤s obtained by …rm i in period t are denoted by i (s t ) where s t 2 n i=1 S i S is the tuple of actions played in period t = 1; 2; ::::; ; :::. Firms cannot accumulate pro…ts, and hence they become bankrupt as long as they have negative pro…ts in a period. If a …rm disappears from the game in subsequent periods, this …rm is supposed to take an action s i which corresponds to no action (i.e. zero output or a price for which demand is always zero). Formally, if i (s t ) < 0; i (s t+r ) = 0; and s t+r i = s i for all r = 1; 2; :::; . Let 2 [0; 1] be the common discount factor.
Payo¤s for the game for …rm i are
We start this section with a very simple observation. Let (s N 1 ; s N 2 ; :::::::s N n ) be a list of actions that is an NE of the static game, and N i be the pro…ts obtained by i in an NE of the one-shot game. Then we have the following:
Observation. Assume that the actions corresponding to a one shot NE are BF . Then: (i) The allocation corresponding to this NE can be sustained as an SPNE of the dynamic game for any :
(ii) When tends to 1, any sequence of action pro…les that are BF and yield pro…ts larger than N i can be sustained as an SPNE. (ii) Let (s 1 ;s 2 ; :::;s t ; ::::) be the sequence of action pro…les with the desired properties. Consider the following strategy for a generic player, say i. At time 1 play the actions 1 i . At time = 2; 3; :::; t; :::if the history only includes actions pro…les (s 1 ;s 2 ; :::;s 1 ) plays i . In any other case play s N i . It is clear that such strategies yield the desired sequence of actions. In addition, by the usual reasoning such strategies are an SPNE when is su¢ ciently close to one.
The above observation requires that the set of BF actions and the NE of the static game have a non-empty intersection. For instance, in Example 1 when the two …rms are di¤erent, …rm 2 does not produce in the Cournot equilibrium so this equilibrium is BF. In Example 2, Cournot equilibrium outputs are (2:5; 2:5) and thus they are BF. 4 Our …rst result corresponds to an asymptotic result for two …rms which is independent on both demand and costs conditions. The result states that, when is su¢ ciently close to one, any NE of the dynamic game yields BF action pro…les in each period. Denoting monopoly pro…ts for …rm i Clearly, when ! 1, the above inequality is impossible, contradicting that we were in an NE. 4 More general conditions under which NE and BE have a non-empty intersection are available under request.
This result can be extended to n …rms in the following sense. For a su¢ ciently large ; in an NE no …rm can drive to bankruptcy all other …rms with an action as long as for all …rms payo¤s in the NE are less than the monopoly payo¤. However, the generalization of Proposition 3 for n > 2
is not possible. The di¢ culty is that, after, say, …rm i is driven bankrupt by an action of …rm j, the strategies of the other …rms can be anything. The following example shows that when n > 2 it is possible to sustain as SPNE allocations that are not BF.
Example 4. Let us consider a market with three …rms and an inverse demand function p(
The unique Cournot equilibrium is
and x C 3 = 0. Now suppose that …rms 1 and 2 collude and maximize their joint pro…ts taking into account the best reply of …rm 3. Thus, denoting z x 1 + x 2 ; the equilibrium is found by max(a z x 3 c 1 )z over (3.5) for i = 3 or max(a z + c 3 2c 1 )z. This yields
Thus, assuming (a + c 1 )=2 > c 3 ; …rm 3 produces a positive output in the collusive outcome.
Assuming also that (a + c 3 2c 1 ) > p 2(a c 1 ); 5 guarantees that in this outcome the pro…ts of all …rms are strictly larger than in the Cournot equilibrium. Now consider the following strategies:
= x J i for all r 2 f1; 2; ::; t 1g and i 2 f1; 2; 3g; then x t i = x J i : Otherwise x t i = x C i . For su¢ ciently close to 1, the previous strategies constitute an SPNE that generates actions x t i = x J i for all t = 1; 2; :::; T; ::: and i = 1; 2; 3. The proof is virtually identical to that for observation 3.
The previous example shatters our hope of extending Proposition 3 to n > 2. Thus, in what follows we turn to characterize Nash equilibria under di¤erent assumptions on the technology. This additional information will provide us with important clues for characterizing the equilibrium set.
Dynamics with Increasing Average Cost
We begin by considering the case of Increasing Average Cost under the following extra assumption. 6 Assumption 2. All …rms have an increasing average cost and product is homogeneous, and for any subset S N; there is a unique (x 1 ;x 2 ; :::;x s ) withx i 6 = 0 for all i 2 S such that i (x 1 ;x 2 ; :::;x s ) = 0 for all i 2 S:
It is easy to …nd su¢ cient conditions on demand and cost functions such that Assumption 2
holds. In what follows, whenever we use the notation (x 1 ;x 2 ; :::;x s ) for any S we refer to the vector described in the Assumption 2. We now adapt the standard de…nition of a minimax payo¤ to the case in which actions are constrained to be BF:
We denote by x i 2 R
The minimax BF payo¤ for …rm i is de…ned as:
The following lemma gives us a handier expression for the minimax BF payo¤ under Assumption 2.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 2, the minimax BF payo¤ is im = max
where (x i ;x i ) >> (0; 0) is such that j (x i ;x i ) = 0 for all j:
Proof. Since the payo¤ of …rm i is a¤ected by the aggregate output of the other …rms but not by which …rm is producing it, the worse situation for …rm i in the BF set is the one with the maximal aggregate output in the set B i : Note that for all x i 2 B i …rm i cannot bankrupt any other …rm. We denote by B i the set of all pairs x i such that …rm i cannot bankrupt any of the other …rms: Notice that B i B i : The set B i is characterized by the following inequalities:
j ( x i ; x i ) 0; for all j 6 = i; (3.9)
The set B i is compact. Thus, the max x i 2 B i X j6 =i x j exist. The maximum is reached atx i >> 0 such that j (x i ;x i ) = 0 for all j: By Assumption 2, (x i ;x i ) is well de…ned and is a BF action pro…le. Thus (x i ;x i ) 2 B i : Therefore,x i = arg max x i 2B i X j6 =i
the minimax BF payo¤ is reduced to:
and the proof is completed.
In the next proposition we show that, for a su¢ ciently large ; no SPNE of the dynamic game can give any …rm a payo¤ lower than its minimax BF payo¤. To formally introduce the result, we need the two following lemmas. The proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let (x 1 ; ::; x n ) be such that all …rms have non negative pro…ts. If
then …rm i can bankrupt some of the other …rms.
Lemma 3. Let S and S 0 be such that S S 0 ; and let k 2 S: The minimax BF payo¤ for …rm k in the economy S ( S km ) is larger than the minimax BF payo¤ for …rm k in the economy S 0 ( S 0 km ):
Proposition 4. There exists 0 2 (0; 1) such that for all 2 ( 0 ; 1), i < im cannot be sustained in any SPNE.
Proof. We prove the proposition by induction on the number of …rms. We start by showing that the statement is true when there are only two …rms in the market.
With two …rms, the minimax BF payo¤ is im = min
Thus, …rm i could have achieved at least im if x t j 2 [0;x j ] for all t; irrespective of . Therefore, if i < im happens in equilibrium, x t j >x j must hold for some t. We show that if this is the case, the continuation payo¤ for i at t in equilibrium; P t i ; must be such that P t i M i ; where M i is the monopoly pro…t. Suppose that P t i < M i ; since x t j >x j , …rm i can bankrupt …rm j retaining non-negative pro…ts, and can achieve a monopoly pro…t in every period from t + 1: Under this situation, the continuation payo¤ for …rm i will be greater than M i : However, M i > P t i , which contradicts the notion that we are in equilibrium. Thus, P t i M i : Since M i ! M i as ! 1; and im < M i ; i must exceed im at some point as increases, which concludes the proof for n = 2.
Suppose that the proposition is true for n 1 …rms. We show that it is true for n …rms. By 3.8, …rm i could have achieved at least im if P j6 =i x t j P j6 =ix j for all t irrespective of . Therefore, if i < im occurs in equilibrium, P j6 =i x t j > P j6 =ix j for some t, and if this is the case, at t …rm i could bankrupt some other …rm. Suppose, without lost of generality, that …rm i can bankrupt …rm k: Since we start with an equilibrium, whatever the strategies that support this equilibrium are, they should be such that in the subgame in which all …rms but k survive, they constitute a Nash equilibrium. We denote by Let us see that the continuation payo¤ for i at t in equilibrium; P t i ; must be such that P t i N k i for some
: If this is the case, …rm i can deviate in period t by bankrupting …rm k and retaining non-negative pro…ts and conforming with the initial strategy thereafter. Thus, …rm i can achieve
pro…ts in every period from t + 1: Under this situation, the continuation payo¤ for …rm i will be greater that Next we give su¢ cient conditions for the existence of an SPNE in our framework. We say that i is an individually rational BF payo¤ if i > im : An individually rational BF vector payo¤
is feasible if there exist a BF action pro…le (x 1 ; :::; x n ) such that i = i (x 1 ; x 2 ; ::; x n ) for all i 2 N:
Proposition 5. Let = ( i ) i2N be a feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector. Then, there exists 0 such that for all 2 ( 0 ; 1), is the average payo¤s in some SPNE.
Proof. The proof is given by constructing an equilibrium which is originally proposed by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) . Let ( i ) i2N be feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector.
By the de…nition of feasibility, there is a BF action pro…le (x 1 ; ::; x n ) such that i = i (x 1 ; ::; x n ) for i 2 N: (3.13)
Suppose each …rm takes this x i , i 2 N in each period if no deviation has occurred, but all i 2 N choosex i , for T periods once one of them unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium path. If no one deviates during these T periods, then …rms go back to the original path. Otherwise, if one of them deviates, then …rms restart this phase for T more periods. We prove that this strategy actually constitutes an SPNE.
First consider a deviation from the equilibrium path. Suppose …rm i takes x 0 i 6 = x i in some period, say period t. By the one-stage-deviation principle (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.110), a deviation is pro…table if and only if …rm i could pro…t by deviating from the original strategy in period t only and conforming thereafter. Therefore, …rm i can bene…t by deviation if and only if
Note that the left hand side of (3.14) is weakly less than
This term is non-positive when is close to 1. Therefore, (3.14) cannot be satis…ed for such T .
By the same argument as above, …rm i can bene…t by deviating from the mutual minmax phase if and only if 9x 00
i ;x i ) + (1 )( + :::
which can be written as:
Since i > im by assumption. This implies that (3.18) never holds when is close to 1.
Thus, both on and o¤ the equilibrium paths, there is no pro…table deviation when is su¢ ciently close to 1. Since we can always construct the above equilibrium for arbitrary as long as it is a feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vector, the proof is complete.
Note that Propositions 3, 4 and 5, (almost) characterize the SPNE set for two …rms and increasing average costs. 7 However if n > 2 we can support non BF actions as equilibria as long as they yield payo¤s above the minimax BF payo¤. In the following proposition we give conditions for this to occur. For simplicity, we work out the case of n = 3; even though our results can be extended to any n > 3 at cost of introducing some additional notation. We de…ne ij im as the minimax BF payo¤ of …rm i when only …rms i and j are in the market.
Proposition 6. Let (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) be a non BF action pro…le such that i (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) > im for all i 2 f1; 2; 3g; and i (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) > ij im for all i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g: Then, there exists 0 such that for all 2 ( 0 ; 1), = ( i ) i2f1;2;3g is the average payo¤s in some SPNE.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that only …rm 3 can be bankrupted. Suppose each …rm takes x i , i 2 f1; 2; 3g in each period but if one of then deviates such that no …rm is bankrupt, then …rms start to choosex S i ; i 2 S = f1; 2; 3g for T periods . If no one deviates during these T periods, then …rms go back to the original path. Otherwise, if one of them deviates in one of this T periods, then …rms restart this phase for T more periods. If one …rm deviates by bankrupting …rm 3, then …rm 1 and 2 chosex S0 i , i 2 S 0 = f1; 2g for T periods. If no one deviates during this phase, then …rms chose ( x 1 ; x 2 ) a BF action pro…le in the market with those two …rms such
If one of them deviates from this phase, then …rms restart this phase for T more periods.
We show that this strategy actually constitutes an SPNE.
First consider the deviation on the equilibrium path when no …rm is bankrupted. Suppose …rm i takes x 0 i 6 = x i in some period, say period t such that this …rm does not bankrupt any other …rm. By the one-stage-deviation principle, deviation is pro…table if and only if …rm i could pro…t by deviating from the original strategy in period t only and conforming thereafter. Therefore, …rm i 7 Only the points in the boundary are not considered in these propositions.
can bene…t by deviation if and only if 9x 0 i such that
Note that the left hand side of (3.19) is weakly less than
This term is non-positive when is close to 1. Therefore, (3.19) cannot be satis…ed for such T .
Deviations from the mutual minmax phase cannot bankrupt any …rm because (x S 1 ;x S 2 ;x S 3 ) is BF: Thus, by the same argument as above, …rm i can bene…t by deviating from the mutual minmax phase if and only if 9x 00
Since i > im by assumption. This implies that (3.23) never holds when is close to 1. Now, consider deviations whereby one …rm can bankrupt …rm 3. Suppose this …rm is …rm 1. 
The above inequality is true if and only if
However, bankrupting a …rm always has a cost, and therefore, i (x 0 i ; x j ; x k ) i < 0: Thus, the above inequality can never hold.
Deviations from the mutual minmax phase with two …rms cannot bankrupt any …rm because
Thus, by the same argument as above, …rm 1 (the same argument applies to …rm 2) can bene…t by deviating from the mutual minmax phase if and only if 9x 00
2 ) + (1 )( + :::
> (1 )(1 + + :::
The previous inequality can be written as:
, (3.26) never holds when is closed to one.
Thus, both on and o¤ the equilibrium paths, there is no pro…table deviation when is su¢ ciently close to 1.
We note that when …rms are required to make v i pro…ts in order to be not bankrupted and v i < 0 this v i can be considered as a part of the cost. In this case, even if we have constant returns to scale, the transformed cost function displays increasing average costs. We now work out an example for two …rms with identical constant average cost but di¤erent …nancial constraints. This special case will allow us to illustrate how the set of feasible and individually rational BF payo¤ vectors changes with the …nancial constraints, and we show that, in some situations, the symmetric collusive output cannot be sustained as an equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Example 5. Let n = 2; p = (3 x 1 x 2 ); c = 1: Let be the set of feasible individually rational bankruptcy free payo¤ vectors. In Figure 4 , 5,6 and 7 we represent the set under di¤erent scenarios. In the …gures, the interior dot denotes the payo¤ for the static Cournot equilibrium,
The dot on the line denotes the payo¤ in a symmetric collusive outcome whereby …rms set a monopoly price and equally divide the share, 1 = 2 = 1=2:
(a) If there is no …nancial constraints, is the set of feasible individually rational payo¤ vectors. Figure 5 (c) If
Figure 7
To summarize, Propositions 4 and 5 point out that introduction of …nancial constraints shrinks the set of equilibrium payo¤s. Example 5 shows that, under asymmetric …nancial constraints, the set of equilibrium payo¤s shrinks in favor of a …rm that has a larger …nancial budget.
Dynamics with Decreasing Average Cost
We address the case of decreasing average costs. We recall that under Assumption 1, only two kind of action pro…le are BF . Action pro…les in which there is only one active …rm (i.e. those under the heading (i) in Proposition 2) and action pro…les in which at least two …rms are active and earn zero pro…ts (i.e. those under the heading (ii) in Proposition 2). In the following proposition we show that the BF action pro…les with at least two active …rms cannot be supported by an NE and we
give conditions under which BF action pro…les with only one active …rm can be supported as NE. is an NE of the one period game and thus these open-loop strategies form, indeed, a NE.
Necessity. Let ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; n ) be a list of strategies that constitute NE and yields in each period a BF action pro…le. Suppose that for some period t there are two …rms with positive output. Since the action pro…le is BF; by part (ii) in Proposition 2, i (x 1 ; ::; x n ) = 0 and @ i (x 1 ; ::; x n )=@x i < 0 for all active …rms. Thus, at t …rm i can reduces an " its output and produce zero in any subsequent period. However, since @ i (x 1 ; ::; x n )=@x i < 0; with this strategy …rm i makes positive pro…ts, which contradicts the notion that we are in NE. Thus, in a NE, one …rm at most is active. The possibility that in NE no …rm is active can be discarded because one …rm would enter in a period, earn positive pro…ts and produce zero thereafter. Thus, in each period there is only one active …rm and (i) above holds. The output of the active …rm must deter entry because otherwise a hit and run entry by another …rm would be pro…table for this …rm, so (ii) also holds. Finally, if …rm j is not producing a monopoly output, a one period change of output by this …rm (continuing with the limit output thereafter) improves the pro…ts of this …rm, contradicting the notion that we are in NE.
Our results here give some support to the idea (which underlies the concept of natural monopoly)
that under increasing returns only one …rm can survive in equilibrium. Indeed, when n = 2 this is the only allocation that can be sustained as an SPNE.
It remains to be shown whether non BF action pro…les can be sustained as an SPNE. Although we do not have a general answer to this question, in the next proposition we show that action pro…les whereby all …rms produces a positive quantity cannot be supported as NE. Letx = (x 1 ;x 2 ; :::;x n ) denote a pro…le of outputs such thatx i > 0 for all i.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 1, when is su¢ ciently close to 1, there is no NE strategy pro…le, fs t g t ; such that there is an > 0 with i (s t ) + M i in each t; yieldingx in a period.
Proof. Suppose there is such strategy pro…le. Let j be the …rm such that AV C j (x j ) AV C i (x i ) for all i. Clearly all pro…ts atx must be non-negative.
First, let j (x j ;x j ) > 0. Let y be such that j (x j + y;x j ) = 0. The existence of y is guaranteed by Assumption 1. Now we have that
so all …rms except j are ruined and j is a monopolist from this period on. For su¢ ciently close to 1, this unilateral change in output increases discounted pro…ts (the same argument as for Proposition 3 can be applied here), which contradicts that the notion that we are in a NE.
Now consider the case where j (x j ;x j ) = 0. Since AV C j (x j ) AV C i (x i ) for all i and to produce zero is always an option it must be that AV C j (x j ) = AV C i (x i ) = p( P n i=1x i ) for all i. Ifx is BF we have shown that it cannot be supported as an NE. If the allocation is not BF, this means that 9k and a x k such that with the resultant price, p(x k + P i6 =kx i ), at least one …rm is bankrupted. However, since AV C j (x j ) = AV C i (x i ) i; j 6 = k this means that all …rms except k can be bankrupted. Thus when is su¢ ciently close to 1, …rm k has incentives to choose x k and to be a monopolist from this period on. Again, the same argument as for Proposition 3 can be applied here to show that, in this case, the deviation increases discounted pro…ts which contradicts the notion that we are in an NE.
The question arises as to whether the bound on the number of active …rms in the previous result is tight. The following example shows that when n = 3 there are SPNE with two active …rms.
Example 6. Suppose that there are three …rms with constant marginal costs equal to zero, a …xed cost K = 1000, and an inverse demand function p( P 3 i=1 x i ) = 100
Consider the following strategies 8 .
(S1) For …rm 1: in the …rst period, produce zero output. Thereafter, if …rms 2 and 3 exists, produce zero output. If, at least, one of these two …rms has disappeared, produce the monopoly output.
(S2) For …rms 2 and 3: in the …rst period, produce the Cournot duopoly output. Thereafter, if the three …rms exists, produce the Cournot duopoly output. If one of these two …rms has disappeared and …rm 1 exists, the remaining …rm produces zero output. If one of these two …rms has disappeared and …rm 1 does not exists, produce the monopoly output. If …rm 2 and 3 exist but …rm 1 has disappeared, then …rm 2 produces the monopoly output and …rm 3 produces cero output.
To prove that (S1) and (S2) yield an SPNE, we …rst note that in this example the following two conditions hold: (C1) When …rms 2 and 3 produce the Cournot duopoly, they obtain positive pro…ts and the best reply by …rm 1 is zero. Furthermore, …rm 1 cannot bankrupt either …rm 2 or …rm 3. Note, however, that the Cournot duopoly is not BF .
(C2) When one …rm produces the monopoly output, this …rm obtains non-negative pro…ts and limits the entry of the other …rms.
By the one-stage-deviation principle, a deviation is pro…table if and only if …rm i can pro…t by deviating from the original strategy in period t only and conforming thereafter.
We …rst show that there is no pro…table deviation from any subgame in which the three …rms exist.
Clearly, since …rm 1 cannot bankrupt …rm 2 or …rm 3 when those …rms are producing the Cournot duopoly output and the best reply of …rm 1 is to produce cero, no deviation can give …rm 1 a better payo¤. Thus, …rm 1 has no incentives to deviate in these subgames. Firms 2 and 3 are completely symmetric in the subgames, so we show that …rm 2 has no incentives to deviate; the same argument applies to …rm 3. Firm 2 has no incentive to kill …rm 3 when they are in a duopoly because it will not enjoy any pro…ts thereafter. Furthermore, …rm 2 has not incentives to deviate from the duopoly outcome when the three …rms exist.
Second, we show that there is no pro…table deviation from any subgame in which two …rms exist.
When only two …rms exist, one produces the monopoly output, which limits the entry of the other …rm, so no pro…table deviation exists.
Finally, in subgames in which only one …rm exists, there are not pro…table deviations since that …rm is producing the monopoly output.
Final Remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of dynamic competition in which …rms may bankrupt each other. We focussed on allocations that are BF in which a …rm can bankrupt others only by bankrupting itself. We have characterized BF allocations under decreasing, constant and increasing returns. Finally, we have shown how BF allocations can be sustained as Nash equilibria in a dynamic game. Our concept of BF allowed us to understand the structure of Nash equilibria in the dynamic game. When there are two …rms or increasing average costs, BF plays the leading role when players are very patient. However we have shown that allocation other than BF can be sustained as subgame perfect Nash equilibria. 9 Our results are obtained at the cost of making several simpli…cations to make the model tractable. For instance, we did not consider coalitions of …rms in the de…nition of BF allocations or re…nements of SPNE (such as renegotiation-proof) to get rid of some equilibria. It is likely that these extensions will not qualitatively alter the nature of our results. However, other issues neglected here might a¤ect our conclusions signi…cantly. Among these the following might be of particular importance.
Mixed strategies
Throughout the paper we have assumed that …rms only use pure strategies, but a good way of avoiding bankruptcy might be to use mixed strategies as boxers use random movements to avoid easy hits. We argue that when n = 2, if the actions played in equilibrium involve a randomization and one of these actions is not BF, for close enough to 1, the best strategy of the other …rm consists in choosing an action that will bankrupt this …rm. This is because sooner or later the probability that the action which is not BF is played is close to 1 so this …rm will be ruined and the predating …rm will enjoy monopoly pro…ts forever. Thus, in this case the BF set gives us a indication of which type of actions will arise in equilibria, regardless of what kind of strategy is played by the agents.
However, in other cases the introduction of mixed strategies might substantially enlarge the set of allocations that might be supported as equilibria of the dynamic game.
No accumulation
In this paper we focused on actions that bankrupt other …rms, but we did not consider the other 9 BF allocations may also be relevant in other circumstances such as when managers are so risk-averse that they would never choose an allocation by which they can be driven out of business. side of bankruptcy, namely the funds that might support or deter aggressive strategies (the "deep pocket" argument). Our result when n = 2 might survive when accumulation is considered. Indeed, suppose as a …rst approximation that in each period the …rms transfer an exogenous quantity of their wealth to next period. Then in each period we can de…ne a BF set that depends on the wealth accumulated by each …rm. If in a period the action chosen by, say, …rm 1, is not BF, …rm 2 may get rid of …rm 1 and enjoy monopoly pro…ts forever. When is su¢ ciently close to 1, this is optimal for …rm 2. In other cases, accumulation of pro…ts might play an important role shaping the NE set as in the model of Rosenthal and Rubinstein (1984) . 10 
Credit
If credit is given on the basis of past performance, the rede…nition of the BF set sketched in the previous paragraph can be applied here and credits can be incorporated into the model. However, if credit is given on the basis of future performance, we have a problem because future performance also depends on credit (via the BF constraints), which makes this problem extremely complex.
This points to a deep conceptual problem about credit in oligopolistic markets where …rms might be bankrupted. This topic should be the subject of future research.
Entry
In this paper we assumed a given number of competitors. This implies that the disappearance of a …rm does not bring a new one in the market. Of course this should not be taken literally. What we mean is that if entry does not quickly follow it makes sense, as a …rst approximation, to analyze the model with a given number of …rms. For instance when n = 2 and demand and costs are linear, ruining a …rm is a good investment even if monopoly last for one period (this example is available under request). In other cases, though, the nature of equilibria will be altered if, for instance, entry immediately follows the ruin of a competitor as in the model of Rosenthal and Spady (1989) . 11 
Buying Competitors
In our model, there is no option to buy a …rm. Sometimes it is argued that buying an opponent may be a cheaper and safer strategy than ruining it. We do not deny that buying competitors 1 0 They characterize a subset of the Nash equilibria assuming that each player regards ruin of the other player as the best possible outcome and his own ruin as the worst possible outcome. 1 1 They consider a prisoner's dilemma in continuous time in a market with room for two …rms only. When a …rm is bankrupted, this …rm is immediately replaced by a new entrant. They show that some kind of predatory behavior can arise in equilibrium.
plays an important role in business practices. However, we contend that under the option of buying, ruining a competitor is irrational. First, buying competitors may be forbidden by a regulatory body because of anticompetitive e¤ects. Second, when the owner of a …rm sells it to competitors, this does not stop her from creating a new …rm and …nance it with the money received from selling the old one. In other words, selling a …rm is not equivalent to a contract in which the owner commits not to enter into a market again. Thus, bankruptcy may be the only credible way of getting rid of a competitor. Finally, buying and ruining of competitors may complement each other because the acquisition value may depend on the aggressiveness of the buyer in the past; see Burns (1986) for some evidence in the American tobacco industry. Thus, it seems that a better understanding of the mechanism of ruin might help to further enhancement of our understanding of how the buying mechanism works in this case.
Summing up, the model presented in this paper illuminates certain aspects of the equilibrium in oligopolistic markets in which …rms may bankrupt each other. We hope that the insights obtained here can be used in further research in this area.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 2. Given that Thus, S 0 km < S km :
